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Insider Information and the Limits of Insider Trading 
Yesha Yadav*  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, the prohibition against insider trading has experienced 
intense scrutiny in the courts, with the Second and Ninth Circuits—and 
eventually the United States Supreme Court—engaging in heated debate 
on the logic and limits of the law.1 Unsurprisingly, given the subject 
matter of the cases, commentary has focused on how broadly the law 
should apply to liability for tipping and trading on corporate secrets.2 Just 
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and federal 
prosecutors were hitting their stride in pursuing a slew of high-profile, 
headline-grabbing cases, the decision of the Second Circuit in U.S. v. 
Newman unexpectedly tightened what kinds of relationships and 
transactions could give rise to liability.3 Authorities could no longer go 
after tipping between friends and family without first having to show that 
the tipper received a meaningful personal benefit for the information and 
the tippee knew of this bargain—a burden that previously had not bothered 
prosecutors too much as the law had allowed them to simply assume such 
a benefit in close relationships.4 After Newman, tippers and tippees down 
the chain of shared confidences found themselves much less likely to be 
caught by the heightened evidentiary standards of what counted as an 
offense. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. Salman, largely upheld by 
the Supreme Court, has reversed most of the heightened fact-finding 
requirements introduced by Newman.5 This back-and-forth between the 
 
* Professor of Law and Enterprise Scholar, Vanderbilt Law School. 
1. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); United States v. Newman, 773 F. 3d 438, 452 
(2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015); United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 
2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016). 
2. See e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Salman v. United States: Insider Trading’s Tipping Point?, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 28 (2016).     
3. Amy, Kristen Bartlett et al., The Ripple Effects of U.S. v. Newman Continue: SEC Lifts 
Administrative Bar on Downstream Insider Trading Tippee and Tipper Requests that Third Circuit 
Vacate SEC Settlement, ORRICK BLOGS (Mar. 2, 2016), https://blogs.orrick.com/securities-
litigation/20 16/03/02/the-ripple-effects-of-u-s-v-newman-continue-sec-lifts-administrative-bar-on-
downstream-insider-trading-tippee-and-tipper-requests-that-third-circuit-vacate-sec-settlement/. 
4. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452-53. 
5. Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420; U.S. v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015); Jon Eisenberg, 
Insider Trading Law After Salman, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 18 
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circuits, however, is still telling. It points to a deeper uncertainty about the 
policy goals of the law and how information flows can reasonably be 
regulated within an innovative, complex securities marketplace.  
This essay offers brief observations on the internal coherence of the 
rationales underlying the prohibition against insider trading, taking the 
opportunity offered by Newman and Salman to reflect on its central policy 
aims. I do not discuss these cases specifically, or what a resolution by the 
Supreme Court might mean for the future of insider trading. Scholars and 
commentators have thoughtfully critiqued Newman alongside the doctrinal 
whiplash that has followed in its wake.6 Rather, I take this opportunity to 
look under the hood of securities trading to examine information flows 
within the mechanisms by which securities are bought and sold. I argue 
that the design of modern markets—and the allocation of informational 
access it institutionalizes—entrenches the place of a cohort of actors that 
systematically enjoy first sight of information coming from exchanges and 
the ability to react to and change prices before others on the “outside” can 
get a look. I have termed this select group of traders “structural insiders.” 
Securities trading has come to be dominated by high-speed traders buying 
and selling securities in milli-and-micro-seconds.7 In order to achieve 
velocity, these traders need to be able to: (i) locate themselves (meaning, 
their computer servers) as close as possible to the exchange’s trading floor 
(meaning, the exchange’s computer servers); (ii) quickly receive 
information from exchange servers to their own; and (iii) be able to reply 
automatically to new information from exchanges without waiting for 
human beings to first read and analyze this data. These three features—
close location (co-location) with exchange servers, information feeds 
between exchanges and traders, and automated response to new 
 
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/18/insider-trading-law-after-salman/.   
6. Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
46, 48-50 (2016); Nagy, supra note 2; Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 64, 69 (2016); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC, Administrative Usurpation, and 
Insider Trading,69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57-60 (2016); Donald C. Langevoort, Informational 
Cronyism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 37, 38-40 (2016).    
7. See e.g., Matthew Baron et al., Risk and Return in High-Frequency Trading, J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=24331 
18; and U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Equity Market Structure Literature Review Part II: High 
Frequency Trading 3-5 (2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf 
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information—give high-speed traders a structural head start in receiving 
information on the state of the market, responding to it and impacting 
prices before those lacking these means can see this information and trade 
on it. In other words, because structural insiders are the first to see and 
trade on new data, those on the outside are forced to transact on stale 
information and old prices.8  
 As I argue in my Article, Insider Trading and Market Structure, the 
emergence of structural insider trading in securities markets tests the 
conceptual bounds of the law and policy of corporate insider trading.9 A 
structural informational advantage for a specialist group of traders creates 
cost-benefit trade-offs that appear analogous to those seen in the more 
familiar context of corporate insider trading. And yet, structural insider 
trading is not only perfectly legal but also widely regarded by 
policymakers as essential to maintaining market function and, on some 
measures, to improving how markets perform.  
To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that high-speed trading—and the 
structural design that enables it—is or ought to be considered illegal by 
bringing the weight of the prohibition to bear on the mechanics of how 
securities are traded. Nor do I wish to imply that there is something 
nefarious about structural insider trading that should merit urgent attention 
from lawmakers. Rather, the goal of this research is twofold. First, it 
draws into relief the differential allocation of informational rights and 
privileges within securities markets. In other words, even though the trade-
offs of trading on confidential corporate information or not-fully-public 
exchange data may be similar, the law applies differently to control use of 
such information for trading. Secondly, if this project has a normative aim, 
it lies in advocating that regulators outline a sharper vision of what counts 
as a harmful and unfair allocation of informational privileges—in other 
words, clarifying what should fall within the prohibition against insider 
trading and why. Should confidential, corporate information merit 
different legal treatment than data from exchanges and trading venues that 
is not-fully-public? If confidential corporate information is different, then 
why? And, to the extent that policymakers are comfortable with imposing 
a different legal regime for confidential corporate information versus 
 
8. Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968, 992-1002 (2016). 
9. Id.  
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trading data, how should the law respond to future technologies that also 
push the limits and traders that seek out opportunities to arbitrage between 
different legal regimes relating to confidential or restricted information?10   
 
I. WHY WE REGULATE TRADING ON INSIDER INFORMATION 
 
With insider trading long the subject of splashy headlines, thrilling 
exposes, and prime-time television shows, its place as a pillar of the 
regulatory canon might well be taken for granted.11 But, this has not 
always been the case. Rather than deriving from statute with express 
congressional mandate, the prohibition against insider trading has grown 
out of the courts and the SEC, its parameters elaborated over time by 
judges and administrative regulation.12 In the absence of a special statute 
to prevent insider trading, jurisprudence anchors the prohibition in the 
general anti-fraud provision of Section 10b of the Securities Act 1934 and 
its Rule 10b-5.13 That the scope of the offense has developed 
incrementally can be seen in the evolving explanatory accounts used to 
justify protecting confidential, corporate information.14  
In the classic sense, the prohibition against insider trading looks to 
protect shareholders from being confidently, consistently out-gunned by 
better-informed directors and managers. Corporate officers, with close 
access to confidential information, can always beat shareholders of a 
company to the most profitable trades in the company’s securities. On 
account of their proximity to confidential information, managers can 
derive systematic rents from the bare fact of their position, rather than any 
 
10. See also, Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading in Derivatives Markets, 103 GEO. L. J. 381 (2015) 
(examining the use of corporate insider information by banks to transact in credit default swaps).  
11. See e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, An Insider Trading Tale That Reads Like a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/books/review/black-edge-sheelah-
kolhatkar.html; and Ethan Wolff-Mann, Watch the New Trailer for Showtime’s Insider Trading 
Drama ‘Billions’, TIME.COM (Aug. 12, 2015), http://time.com/money/3994583/showtimes-billions-
insider-trading-giam atti-damian-lewis-wall-street-series/ 
12. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); In re Merrill Lynch, 43 S.E.C. 933, 936–
40 (1968); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-50 (2d Cir. 1968), rev’d on other 
grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d. Cir. 1971). 
13. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912; Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the 
Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 431–35 (2013) (describing the role 
of Rule10b-5 as the basis for the prohibition). 
14. See Langevoort, supra note 13 (noting the differing grounds offered for the prohibition). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/14
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special skill in trading or analyzing a company’s future prospects. 
Shareholders always lose; insider-managers always win.15 Knowing that 
they cannot beat insider managers, rational shareholders will be wary of 
entering the market, or at least reduce the amount of capital they 
contribute to account for the likelihood of loss. From the standpoint of 
market quality, if shareholders engage in this kind of discounting, capital 
markets will be poorer, leaving public companies to face higher capital 
costs when trying to raise money.16  
Another key reason for the prohibition is also grounded in this policy 
concern. Under Cady Roberts, corporate officers in a fiduciary position to 
their shareholders must disclose their plans to trade on confidential 
information, or face a prohibition on trading. The law works to impose 
restrictions on corporate insiders as a way to level the playing field 
between shareholders and corporate insiders with access to confidential 
information. By imposing costs on corporate insiders, the law limits the 
possibility of shareholder suffering systematic losses and markets 
suffering from resulting economic harm as capital allocation is impacted 
in securities markets. 
The classic account, however, leaves unresolved the question of how to 
control the conduct of outsiders that either routinely come into contact 
with confidential information (e.g. lawyers) or those who happen upon 
such intelligence by chance (e.g. coming upon confidential files).17 These 
scenarios pose a legal headache because such people do not always owe a 
duty of care and loyalty as fiduciaries to a company’s shareholders. Yet, 
they can also cause similar harms to those arising out of trading by insider 
managers. If outsiders trade on a company’s confidential information, their 
conduct diminishes the value of shareholders’ rights in their company’s 
confidential information. Further, similar to the classic account, it raises 
 
15. For example, in the absence of the prohibition, if managers know that the company will suffer a 
heavy loss, they will sell their shares before damaging information comes to light. Shareholders 
holding these shares or those buying shares from managers will end up holding securities that lose 
value when managers sell their securities and when the negative information becomes public. 
Managers thus win, while existing and future shareholders end up losing. 
16. See William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Non-Public Information on Impersonal Stock 
Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 
1222–35 (1981) (discussing the underlying rationales for the prohibition).  
17. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–29 (1980).  
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concerns for market quality, where shareholders become wary of investing 
their capital because they can lose out to informed outsiders.   
How should the law assign responsibility for keeping information 
secret? Is someone who finds misplaced files in a train compartment under 
the same legal duty to protect this information from disclosure as the 
company’s attorney? Though the law briefly flirted with the concept of 
requiring that everyone have equal access to information, such that anyone 
who trades on secret information without authorization may be liable, it 
now looks to impose liability on anyone that contracts to keep information 
secure.18 Under U.S. v. O’Hagan, anyone who “misappropriates” 
confidential information for trading securities may be liable for the offense 
of insider trading.19 This source need not be the company itself: it may be 
the law firm that advises the company, or a printer that contracts to 
produce the company’s annual reports. Instead of looking to a defendant’s 
fiduciary duty to a company’s shareholders, the law can instead look to a 
defendant’s duty to his or her own employer.20 Under the misappropriation 
theory of insider trading, the law can cast a wide net to protect confidential 
corporate information held by a moving cast of characters, not all of which 
may be corporate insiders.21  
Though the classical and misappropriation grounds for liability are 
broad, they do not mandate full and equal access across investors. If 
someone simply happens upon confidential information and does not owe 
a duty of loyalty to the source of this information, then she is free to trade 
under either theory. The existence of a fiduciary duty acts as a controlling 
check to limit liability.  
Despite these constraints, however, regulation and jurisprudence have 
sought to broaden the perimeter of what kinds of relationships might give 
rise to a duty to maintain confidentiality. Under the SEC’s Rule 10b5-2, 
for example, relationships of trust and closeness—those between spouses 
 
18. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 1315 (2009) (detailing the broadening application of the prohibition to sanction theft and misuse 
of confidential information). 
19. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: 
Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 (1998). 
20. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54. 
21. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (hackers held to have misappropriated 
information for the purposes of insider trading liability).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/14
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or business associates—can create the duty necessary to make trading on 
confidential information obtained through such interactions a potential 
offense.22 Courts have shown themselves willing to stretch legal 
interpretation to find that a breach of a fiduciary duty has taken place in 
order to impose sanctions on bad actors.23 For example, hackers stealing 
confidential information from databases and trading on this stolen 
intelligence have been found to have committed insider trading even 
though they do not easily fit the definition of fiduciaries.24 In this way, the 
law generally has shown itself to be strongly protective of a company’s 
confidential information and the value it holds for its shareholders. 
Despite the prohibition’s centrality and its widening reach over the 
years, it has not come without controversy. Influential scholars have 
offered powerful critiques of its rationales, arguing that, far from being a 
positive for market quality, it is in fact deeply detrimental for market 
performance. As Professor Henry Manne famously argued, restrictions on 
information flow are damaging because they reduce how efficiently 
markets perform.25 Because insiders cannot trade freely, high-quality, 
well-sourced information about a company’s fundamentals is not as 
clearly reflected in securities prices.26 Though shareholders may lose 
money against better-informed insiders, the overall robustness of markets 
can be enhanced by a more accurate, detailed flow of insider knowledge 
and insight.27 
 
II. STRUCTURAL INSIDERS AND INSIDER TRADING 
 
So, what does market structure, the mechanisms governing how 
securities are bought and sold, have to do with the law and policy of 
insider trading? Securities markets have undergone a thoroughgoing 
structural transformation in recent years, reflected in the steady and ever 
 
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2012). 
23. Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 431–33 (2013) (noting the broadening of the reach of Rule 10b-5’s 
prohibition, to extend to such situations like hacking as well as under Rule 10b5-2.).  
24. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51.  
25. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET  77-88 (1966). 
26. Id. at 100-05.  
27. Id. at 80-90. 
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fuller automation of the processes by which securities are bought and 
sold.28 I argue that today’s markets comprise a cohort of “structural 
insiders” that are the first to see information from exchanges.29 This head-
start, combined with their capacity to respond automatically to new data, 
gives these structural insiders the ability to trade and change prices before 
others on the “outside” receive the information. This structural insider 
trading, I suggest, exhibits some of the harms seen in more conventional 
corporate insider trading. However, unlike corporate insider trading, 
structural insider trading in market structure constitutes a clearly lawful 
practice.30   
One may visualize modern market structure as a collection of computer 
servers and sophisticated algorithms rather than traders huddling in trading 
pits.31 Computerized processes govern how we trade securities (e.g. 
analyzing incoming news, submitting orders to buy and sell shares, 
matching these orders, and moving trades towards execution and 
settlement), thereby accelerating dramatically the pace of transactions. 
According to the SEC’s 2014 review, high-frequency trading (HFT), in 
which securities turn over in milliseconds and microseconds, drives over 
fifty percent of all traded U.S. equity volume.32 Enabling securities to 
change hands at this speed necessitates that markets include some key 
structural features: (i) traders should be able to get data to their servers 
rapidly from exchanges; (ii) traders’ algorithms must be capable of 
crunching this data and responding automatically by sending orders to an 
exchange without the need for real-time human intervention; and (iii) 
physics dictates that traders be able to locate their servers as close as 
possible to those of the exchange to reduce (as much as possible) the time 
 
28. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., FORESIGHT: THE FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING IN FINANCIAL 
MARKETS: FINAL PROJECT REPORT 19-20 (2012) 
29. Yadav, supra note 8.  
30. But see, City of Providence v. BATS Global Markets, Inc., 878 F.3d 36  (2d. Cir. 2017) 
(plaintiffs argue that exchanges defrauded investors by failing to communicate the systematic 
structural advantages of HFT. The Second Circuit has allowed the case against the exchanges to 
proceed). 
31. Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, High Frequency Traders: Angels or Devils?, C.D. HOWE INST. (2013), 
https://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/Commentary_391.pdf 
32. SEC, Equity Market Structure Literature Review, Part II: High Frequency Trading 4–7 (2014),  
https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/14
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it takes for data and orders to travel from the exchange to the traders’ 
servers and back again.33 
Exchanges have developed infrastructure to accommodate HFT, 
adapting the architecture of information flows to encourage the rapid 
transfer of data between traders and trading venues. While a fuller 
discussion is outside the scope of this essay, three key innovations are 
worth highlighting. First, exchanges like the NYSE and the NASDAQ 
allow traders to locate their servers next to those of the exchange. Both the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ, for example, own extensive real estate (notably 
in New Jersey) specifically designed to warehouse the servers belonging 
to traders right next to those of the trading venue.34 In other words, 
communication between the exchange and trader occurs not on the trading 
floor on Wall Street, but between co-located servers housed together in 
specialist facilities built to enable the high-speed movement of order-and-
price-related data between traders and exchanges. Indeed, exchanges are 
constantly innovating to offer products that provide ever-faster means to 
communicate with their traders. Commentators have spoken of a “race to 
zero” as venues compete with one another to offer ever more cutting edge 
technologies to transmit data, e.g., using lasers or microwaves that can 
embed information for transmission between traders and exchanges.35 
Reflecting the shift to algorithmic, high-speed trading, then, the modern 
exchange looks and works very differently to its conventional portrayal in 
popular culture.36 Using algorithms, traders send orders to buy and sell 
securities from their servers to those of an exchange. These servers are co-
located mere meters away from one another in vast warehouses. An 
exchange’s servers match orders from buyers and sellers and then confirm 
 
33. Yadav, supra note 6.  
34. Michael Aitken et al., Trade Size, High Frequency Trading, and Co-Location Around the 
World, EUR. J. FIN. (forthcoming Mar. 2014); Michael Mackenzie & Jeremy Grant, NYSE Euronext 
Bets on ‘Co-Location’ Centres, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/2d62bcfa-
ad26-11de-9caf-00144feabdc0.  
35. Scott Patterson, High-Speed Stock Traders Turn to Laser Beams, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/highspeed-stock-traders-turn-to-laser-beams-1392175358. 
36. See Matthew Philips, My Laser is Faster Than Your Laser, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-04-23/high-speed-trading-my-laser-is-faster-than-your-
laser.  
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the deal by transmitting this fact back to the co-located servers of the 
traders.37  
Secondly, exchanges offer proprietary subscription feeds of 
information comprising data related to orders and prices that is generated, 
collated and coded by the exchange. Traders can purchase granular, 
detailed flows of information that describe the state of the market, such as 
the buy-and-sell orders coming into the exchange, the depth of demand for 
securities indicated by the volume of orders, the last best prices at which a 
security traded and so on.38 These data feeds are delivered directly from 
the exchange to the trader’s co-located servers. Such subscription feeds do 
not come cheap. In addition to the fees that exchanges charge traders to 
co-locate their servers, data feeds are an important source of revenue for 
trading venues.39 Recent years have seen traders complain about the rising 
costs of purchasing data feeds and server space in an exchange’s 
warehouse.40 They are, however, essential everyday items for traders 
seeking to make their money using HFT strategies.  
Finally, HFT traders depend on sophisticated algorithms that are 
capable of responding automatically to new information as it emerges 
from the market. Because it is biologically impossible for human beings to 
achieve the feat of transacting on a millisecond-by-millisecond basis, 
traders need algorithms programmed to receive data, analyze its 
significance, and respond by themselves in line with pre-set instructions. 
Simply put, human beings are not involved in the trade-by-trade decision-
making; rather, they program their algorithms ex ante for this task and 
monitor their performance during the day. High-speed algorithms must be 
entirely automated in their operation, continuously receiving data, 
analyzing its content and responding by sending out orders. These 
algorithms must be powerful enough to interact with those of other traders 
 
37. Yadav, supra note 8, at 996-98. 
38. See Shengwei Ding et al., How Slow is the NBBO? A Comparison with Direct Exchange Feeds, 
49 FIN. REV. 313 (2014) (discussing the shortcomings in speed and content of the public feed v. direct 
feeds).  
39. John McCrank, IEX Says Stock Exchanges Should Disclose More on Data Revenue, REUTERS 
(Jun. 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-exchange-data/iex-says-stock-exchanges-
should-disclose-more-on-data-revenue-idUSKBN19C2VA. 
40. Matt Turner, There's a New 'Hot-Button' Issue on Wall Street, and Battle Lines are Being 
Drawn, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/stock-exchanges-market-data-
cost-beco ming-big-issue-2016-10. 
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and to respond dynamically to incoming news and a changing market 
environment.41  
These three features together, preconditions for HFT to flourish, mean 
that co-located HFT traders receiving direct feeds of information from 
exchanges constitute a type of structural insider in today’s marketplace. 
By dint of co-location and data feeds, they receive a first look at exchange 
data. With this advantage, HFT traders can respond automatically to new 
information by sending back an order, changing prices before others on 
the “outside” can get a look.42 A cohort of traders, then, receive detailed 
exchange data, react to it and are able to impact the state of the market, 
such that those on the outside systematically transact on the basis of stale 
information.43  
To be sure, it is debatable whether the data that exchanges generate 
constitutes the kind of confidential information that the law seeks to 
regulate under the prohibition against corporate insider trading. For a start, 
this data is designed to be disseminated widely across the market.44 That 
some traders receive it before others should not perhaps matter. Secondly, 
this data may not really seem like the kind of information that the law 
traditionally targets. A first view of price-and-order flow related data 
hardly appears like the stuff of headlines, unlike tips about a company’s 
future merger, a surprise earnings announcement or corporate scandal. 
Thirdly, it is arguable that some traders have always enjoyed greater 
proximity to the exchange relative to others, like those working physically 
next to the trading pits. Algorithmic structural insiders, therefore, might 
just be following a long line of well-established historical precedent.   
While these arguments are appealing at first glance, they fall short 
under deeper scrutiny. Importantly, even though exchange data is 
eventually intended to become public, the law still treats this information 
as restricted and subject to strict conditions about its dissemination.45 
 
41. Michael Kearns & Yuriy Nevmyvaka, Machine Learning for Market Microstructure and High 
Frequency Trading, in HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING-NEW REALITIES FOR TRADERS, MARKETS AND 
REGULATORS 4-8 (David Easley, Marcos López de Prado & Maureen O’Hara eds., 2013). 
42. Yadav, supra note 8, at 992-1003. 
43. Yadav, supra note 6. 
44. Regulation National Market System Rule 603, 17 C.F.R. § 242.603 (2010).  
45. Id. 
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Regulation thus stipulates how and when information becomes public.46 
Specifically, exchanges must ensure that information enters the public data 
feed and the direct subscription feeds at exactly the same time.47 To be 
clear, these rules do not regulate whether different types of traders also 
must receive this information at the same time.48 This legal caveat allows 
exchanges to construct information feeds that permit certain traders to 
systematically receive price-related data earlier than others. Not only are 
direct subscription feeds designed to communicate with co-located traders 
at rapid speeds, but they are packed with a much richer reserve of data 
than what exchanges include in the public feed.49  
The larger question lies in working out what impact these differences in 
access to exchange information have on traders. Are these variations 
economically significant to ensure that structural insiders are able to win 
against other traders? Anecdotal evidence would seem to answer in the 
affirmative. The fact that traders continue to pay for increasingly 
expensive data and co-location fees suggest that they add enough value to 
justify this outlay. Moreover, though the profits of HFT firms have been 
falling, many have been successful at reaping, consistent gains.50 Perhaps 
the best-known example is that of Virtu Financial, whose 2014 IPO filing 
document revealed that its ability to deploy its HFT strategies had resulted 
in the firm enjoying a near flawless winning streak over four years of 
operation, losing money on just a single day during this period.51 This 
example still does not tell us whether the ability of HFT traders to make 
money in this way is dependent on their ability to get a first look of 
exchange information. However, the advantages of structural insider 
trading do seem to matter considerably. Empirical studies show that HFT 
 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id.; Regulation National Market System Rule 600, 17 C.F.R. § 242.600 (2010); Regulation 
National Market System Rule 611, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2010); Gary Stone, SIP vs. Direct Feeds 
Latency - What Are the Rules? BLOOMBERG TRADEBOOK (May 15, 2014), 
https://www.bloomberg.com /professional/blog/sip-vs-direct-feeds-latency-rules/.  
49. New York Stock Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67857, 2012 WL 4044880 (Sept. 14, 
2012). 
50. Gregory Meyer, How High-Frequency Trading Hit a Speed Bump, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/d81f96ea-d43c-11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44. 
51. Greg Laughlin, Insights into High Frequency Trading From the Virtu Initial Public Offering 2–
4 (Ctr. for Analytical Fin., Univ. of Cal. Santa Cruz, Working Paper, 2014). 
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traders have made markets much better at reflecting new information, at 
least in the very near term.52  Tellingly, HFT traders appear to predict the 
direction of the order flow over a few seconds.53 This capacity to 
anticipate market direction and to trade accordingly would seem to follow 
from the ability of traders to see information ahead of others in the market 
and respond quickly in order to make consistent gains by trading with 
those who may be less informed.  
Putting this together, structural insider trading represents a paradigm 
shift from past eras of market design. Historically, a group of actors has 
always enjoyed a proximity advantage in relation to their ability to access 
information from exchanges. In the past, these traders have included the 
so-called designated “specialists” charged by the NYSE to maintain 
market function by standing ready to buy and sell with investors to thus 
provide flow and continuity to trading. Recognizing their centrality and 
their ready access to data about who was trading, what and for how much, 
a body of law carefully regulated the ability of these specialists to transact 
using the insider information accessible on account of their position.54 In 
addition to specialists, some traders have always enjoyed proximity to 
exchanges, such as by working closer to the pits, or by dint of paying for 
and possessing more sophisticated technology than their peers, like carrier 
pigeons, the telegraph or fax.55 From this viewpoint, one can argue that 
HFT structural insiders simply continue an age-old tradition of traders 
leveraging their natural geographical advantage or their skill at 
communicating faster than their peers.56  
Notwithstanding this similarity on the surface, HFT traders possess a 
systematic advantage distinct from traders in eras past. Notably, HFT 
traders utilize technology that is designed to respond automatically, in 
milliseconds, to new information, removing the human element entirely 
 
52. See Jonathan Brogaard et al., High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery (Eur. Cent. Bank, 
Working Paper No. 1602, 2013). 
53. Id. 
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a-1 (2008); FINRA Reg. Notice 11-24 (May 2011); Press Release, SEC, 
SEC Charges The New York Stock Exchange with Failing to Police Specialists (Apr. 12, 2005), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-53.htm.  
55. Joel Hasbrouck et al., New York Stock Exchange Systems and Trading Procedures (N.Y. Stock 
Exchange Working Paper No. 93-01, 1993). 
56. See Jerry Adler, Raging Bulls: How Wall Street Got Addicted to Light-Speed Trading, WIRED 
(Aug. 3, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/08/ff_wallstreet_trading/.  
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from real-time transactions.57 This helps HFT traders enjoy pervasive 
information processing advantages relative to those on the outside. In less 
automated markets, a trader in Montana transacting on the NYSE might 
still beat another trader transacting from the exchange’s floor by virtue of 
possessing better insights about the security or the direction of the order 
flow. Today, with HFT, the playing field is more clearly and 
systematically tilted in favor of the structural insider. The HFT trader will 
always receive information first through co-location and detailed direct 
feeds and be able to respond to this new information automatically without 
waiting for a human being to analyze the data.58 By contrast, the trader in 
Montana will receive information from the slower, public feed, analyze 
this data and respond with an order on the basis of information that is 
already stale.59 Even if the trader in Montana pays for a subscription feed 
but does not buy co-located space, she will receive information with a 
delay owing to the geographic distance.60 Moreover, when the Montana 
trader’s order is sent to the NYSE, it becomes part of the order flow data 
entering the exchange. As the exchange publishes this data through a 
direct feed, it is seen first by HFT structural insiders who can then trade 
ahead of the Montana trader by responding automatically to this new data 
of co-location and doing so faster than anyone on the outside.61 While the 
trader in Montana might certainly make money from the trade, perhaps 
because she possesses profitable, fundamental insights, she will 
nevertheless lose a small part of this eventual gain to the HFT trader.62 
This uneven allocation of informational advantages brings costs and 
benefits similar to those in conventional insider trading. In the case of 
traditional corporate insider trading, regulation is justified to reflect the 
harm arising from one set of shareholders being constantly outrun and 
beaten to the best trades by insider managers, or by those possessing 
confidential information because of their access to it. Shareholders that 
 
57. Alain Chaboud, Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson & Clara Vega, Rise of the Machines: 
Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market, 69 J. OF FIN. 2045 (2014) 
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59. Yadav, supra note 8, at 1026-29. 
60. Yadav, supra note 8, at 1026-29. 
61. Yadav, supra note 8, at 997-1003, 1026-29.  
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/14
YADAV ARTICLE  4/9/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] Insider Information and the Limits of Insider Trading 147 
 
 
know that they will always lose against better-informed insiders will 
discount what they invest or exit the market altogether.  
For a start, structural insider trading allows HFTs to make steady and 
systematic gains unavailable to those on the “outside.” As noted above, 
finance scholars have observed that HFT traders tend to accurately predict 
the near term direction of order flow. This facility in forecasting the likely 
movement of share prices makes sense from the standpoint of structural 
insider trading. Because HFT traders have the first view of data from 
exchanges, they are better able to see where market prices are headed.63  
This ability allows HFT traders to make regular, consistent gains ahead 
of those on the outside. Importantly, by knowing in which direction the 
market is moving, HFT traders can gauge likely demand and transact 
ahead of slower, structural outsiders. For example, an HFT trader 
receiving direct feeds of data to their co-located servers may see that there 
is demand to buy securities of Public Company. Direct feeds can reveal 
such interest by disclosing steadily increasing prices for Public Company’s 
shares. A first look at the latest prices for Public Company’s stock allows 
HFT traders to submit competitive orders to purchase Public Company’s 
shares and then to turn around and sell them to other investors at a slightly 
higher price at which the HFT trader bought them. In addition to making a 
small profit on each trade, this strategy allows the HFT to enter a trade 
knowing that its risk is low, given the tiny increments of time over which 
positions are taken. From the standpoint of structural outsiders, this 
practice is likely to be undesirable. Informed traders that spend time and 
expense in investigating companies may see a small portion of their 
eventual winnings lost to HFT structural insiders who are capable of 
anticipating their orders and thus freeriding on their investment 
knowledge.64  
Interestingly, some scholars argue that market quality can suffer where 
information becomes expensive. They observe, notably, that those who 
must pay dearly for information may choose to reduce their engagement in 
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the marketplace.65 This finding makes a great deal of sense. Investors who 
must spend money on information infrastructure (e.g. to purchase 
subscriptions to data feeds, or perhaps to co-locate their servers near an 
exchange) are likely to be less motivated to spend additional funds on 
researching information. Or, they may shift their attention to less complex, 
less costly research. If investors see their orders being anticipated, and a 
portion of their gains being reaped by a structural insider, they may enter 
the market less often, or seek ways to avoid HFT traders. Anecdotally, 
some fundamental investors have sought to shift some of their trading to 
non-exchange venues that advertise themselves as offering a trading 
environment with limited or no HFT trading.66  
Just like more conventional theories of insider trading, there are also 
many benefits to structural insider trading and to crafting policies that 
encourage this cohort of traders to enjoy a preferential and rapid access to 
exchange data. For example, scholars underscore the benefits of HFT for 
improving the efficiency of securities markets as traders react in 
milliseconds to new information, helping prices to quickly reflect the most 
current state of the markets.67 Further, commentators note that investors 
face reduced costs in trading, as HFT traders offer ready-made 
counterparties to those seeking to buy or sell securities. Facing lower risks 
on account of their structural insider access to information, HFT traders 
can offer investors opportunities to transact at much lower costs 
(“spreads”).68 In this way, HFT traders bring structural efficiencies to 
market structure. They help prices to quickly reflect incoming news; 
investors see lower transaction costs in trading. HFT, however, does not 
directly increase the depth of information in the market.69  Unlike 
 
65. See David Easley et al., Differential Access to Price Information in Financial Markets 1, 3–6 (J. 
Of Fin. & Qualitative Analysis, Working Paper No. 11-2011, 2013).  
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(Jan. 19, 2015).  
67. See Yadav, supra note 8, at 992, 1018-21; and  Sarah Zhang, Need for Speed: An Empirical 
Analysis of Hard and Soft Information in a High Frequency World (Oct. 17, 2012), 
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69. Yadav, supra note 8, at 1023-26. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/14
YADAV ARTICLE  4/9/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] Insider Information and the Limits of Insider Trading 149 
 
 
conventional corporate insider trading, where directors or corporate 
insiders might offer unique insights through their transactions, structural 
insiders do not add to the informational content of the market. Rather, they 
enable information to enter the market more quickly and give investors the 
access to ready liquidity when they wish to trade.70 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The goal of this essay and the accompanying Article is not to argue that 
HFT constitutes an illegal activity under Rule 10b-5, nor to suggest that it 
merits sanction for giving traders – through co-location and direct feeds – 
an upper hand in catching first sight of key market data. HFT is, of course, 
perfectly legal and the practice of exchanges offering co-location products 
and detailed data feeds similarly allowed under regulation. Any inference 
of possible illegality is negated by the fact that this activity occurs in the 
open and is overseen by the SEC. Nevertheless, structural insider trading 
offers a lens through which to analyze the overall internal coherence of 
how we regulate sensitive, confidential information in public securities 
markets. Like trading on corporate confidential information, structural 
insider trading underlying HFT systematically gives one set of investors 
the opportunity to transact on information not fully available to everyone 
else. HFT traders, by dint of co-location, direct feeds and automated 
responses, can trade on the most up-to-the-microsecond view of the 
market, and change prices as a result, before this information enters the 
bloodstream of the outsider investing public. Just like trading on corporate 
confidential information, this preferential position can cause certain harms 
familiar to scholars of insider trading, reflected in disadvantaged investors 
looking to scale back or adapt their participation in capital markets. The 
benefits of insider trading also look similar. Corporate insider trading can 
bring deeper informational efficiencies; structural insider trading offers 
infrastructural efficiencies reflected in the ability of prices to quickly 
signal the latest state of risk in the market. Of course, these practices are 
not exactly alike. Perhaps one can argue that any trader is technically free 
to buy co-located space or direct feeds and develop automated trading 
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technology to achieve the status of structural insider – whereas not 
everyone can become a corporate director or manager. And yet, even here, 
such differences are more theoretical than real. Though everyone might 
technically be able to buy themselves a spot alongside the matching 
engines of the NYSE, it is far too costly to imagine that taking up this 
option is actually feasible for all but the most resourced, specialist trader.  
But the co-existence of structural insider trading alongside more 
common corporate insider trading – where the former is legal and the latter 
is not – draws into relief the unevenness in the law and policy governing 
the regulation of restricted information in public markets. Broadly, these 
variations in the allocation of information rights and costs between 
investors – with one set able to trade more freely on restricted information, 
while another cannot – forces a larger reckoning for policymakers to 
clarify the purposes of insider trading policy in the innovation age. Why 
can a structural insider enjoy a systematically stronger hand against an 
outsider investor, when a corporate director cannot? Should structural 
insider trading require greater regulation to bring it into line with corporate 
insider trading law, or should the prohibition against corporate insider 
trading be relaxed to resemble the permissions allowed to HFT traders? 
Or, perhaps, the regimes should remain as they currently are – but if this is 
to be the case, then why? As I show in my research, the law and policy of 
corporate insider trading faces broader conceptual challenges from 
innovations in financial markets that have evolved with little regard paid 
to the traditional bounds of the law against insider trading. HFT provides 
one such example, as its traders have pioneered a practice that is both 
historically familiar but also novel in its business model, leveraging skill, 
automated technology and access to give its users a first look of market-
moving, sensitive exchange data. The tussle between Newman and Salman 
has resulted in courts returning to a broad prohibition on insiders trading 
on confidential information. With this return to broad liability, it is urgent 
to clarify why the law takes this approach and how fully it should apply. 
Without it, confidential market information is left at once over- as well as 
under-protected and traders are invited to find ways, once more, to 
innovate around the law.  
 
         
     
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/14
